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Abstract
This article aims at assessing the evolution of BRICS’ positions on climate change 
global governance. We discuss the implications of that positioning for the 
role of the group on that theme. From the analysis of the main regimes and 
agreements, we argue that although there is a disposition to act in multilateral 
forums, they face a series of constraints that makes difficult for them to adopt 
a common ground. 
Resumo
Este artigo objetiva avaliar a evolução da posição do BRICS na governança 
global sobre mudança climática. Discute-se as implicações desse posicionamento 
para o papel do grupo neste tema. A partir da análise dos principais regimes 
e acordos, argumentamos que embora haja a disposição de agir nos fóruns 
multilaterais, eles enfrentam uma série de constrangimentos que dificultam a 
adoção de uma posição comum. 
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Introduction
Currently, a central issue that has gained ground in international relations analysis is climate change. One feature of this research-agenda concerns the attempts to 
settle conventions and international regimes in order to elaborate 
norms, rules, and general principles that would gear countries’ actions 
towards some efforts to tackle negative effects of climate change. 
It also includes the rational use of natural resources in industrial 
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productive processes, the capability of transforming high-carbon economies into low ones, and the 
improvement of domestic infrastructure, etc. In one way or another, the climate problem affects 
everyone, demanding effective and shared solutions, as the forecast for the future indicates a bad 
climate and environment scenarios.
 In this context, equally important are the institutional mechanisms by which the negotiations 
and agreements are settled. As it is a general problem, we should hope that all affected have ways to 
participate and contribute to eventual solutions, given that the responsibility to tackle is directly related 
to the responsibility for causing it. Having said that, the emergent countries, for the recent contribution 
they have been giving to worsen the climate situation, are central subjects to be considered. Their 
participation is fundamental if the international community aspire to reach satisfactory results on 
mitigating negative effects of the problem exposed here. The challenges, however, consists not only 
of advancing with necessary and sufficient solutions, but especially concerting common positions 
that tend to follow the same path. 
This paper, thus, aims at identifying and assessing the evolution of BRICS1 positions on global 
governance for climate change. We hope to gather means to discuss the implications of that positioning 
for international politics, mainly those that involve the role of emergent countries in multilateral 
negotiation forums, the possibilities and constraints, and their contributions to agreements and goals 
related to climate. Besides, this analysis would enable us to delineate future research frameworks, 
encouraging the continuity of studies in this area.
From the reading of agreements and main results of global negotiation process about climate2, it 
is possible to identify the role assumed by BRICS’ countries. A central issue that we have recognized 
with potential to be explored in this paper is the importance of the proposal of ‘Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions’ (INDC) to the effectiveness of practices intended to address the effects 
of climate problems. 
The discussion presented here deepens in the sense of demonstrating that although the BRICS 
are willing to actively promote and participate in international regimes related to climate, there are 
a series of constraints which hinder the adoption of a unique stance. National interests, differences 
on individual goals, specific energy dilemmas and disagreements about binding commitments are 
factors that explain these hindrances. 
Thereby, this paper is divided as follows: after the introduction, the central conferences established 
about climate change will be highlighted, showing historically how the process of negotiation was 
settled and the major results achieved. Afterwards, some space will be dedicated to BRICS actions, 
as well as the implications for the group performance for international politics. On Final Remarks, 
we will sketch a summary of the main findings that this work has presented. 
1 Cf. O’Neill, 2001. 
2 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and others COPs.
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International climate regimes: history and accomplishments
The climate issue is historically recent. The debates spread out mainly around the 1970’s3, 
and they revealed the need to consider the connections between nature and society, environment 
and human development, and the sustainability of our production-consumption’s model for the 
next generations as intrinsically as possible. It is difficult, then, to approach these themes without 
referring to the attempts to establish some general understanding about those links. We assume that 
climate change is not only an environmental issue, but also an economic, social, and security one 
(Barros-Platiau, 2010).
In this sense, the starting point after Stockholm was the creation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 1990, to evaluate the climate changes and its impacts over the 
ecosystem, humankind and society. In its central report, the IPCC concludes that the emission of 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) by all sorts of human activities is the main cause of current climate changes4.
In this context, the international community worked with the endeavor to create an international 
regime5 to address these problems, and the establishing of the Conference of Rio (Rio-92)6 and 
subsequent arrangements of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
both early in the 1990’, were a turning point on that. The purposes were to introduce and discuss the 
idea of sustainable development and ecological balance of economic growth, along with the raising 
importance that the environmental topic was experiencing in recent decades. 
The Conferences of Parties (COPs) that followed these negotiations were equally important. 
They were settled as an annual organization to reach global commitments under UNFCCC’s 
umbrella. Gathering a great number of countries (most of them major emitters of GHG), the COPs 
witnessed advances and backlashes in terms of establishing an international climate regime. The 
Convention forecasts that all Parties should prepare national inventories of their emissions of GHG7, 
and subsequently implement some measures to mitigate the negative effects, seeking principally to 
control the global warming.
One of the most important (and controverted) agreement on UNFCCC was the acknowledgment 
of the ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ (CBDR) principle, i.e, that all countries should 
work with some obligations and goals, but historical and socio-economic issues should be taken into 
account8. Therefore, the developed countries and the developing ones held distinct responsibilities. 
At this point, the countries were divided in two groups: the developed included in a category designated 
3 The first global conference on environment was at Stockholm 1972, named United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.
4 To avoid deep modifications on planet’s natural conditions, the IPCC has recommended that is necessary to prevent the elevation 
of earth’s temperature above 2°C until 2050. Cf. IPCC, 1990.
5 Regime will be considered as a formal or informal organized arrangement in which the principles, norms, rules and decision-taking 
procedures reflect the voluntary action of the States. Its operation, however, depends on the engagement of the most interested 
actors in its functioning. Cf. Krasner, 2009.
6 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Cf. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
Agenda21.pdf>.
7 Cf. UNFCCC, 2015. 
8 Cf. UNFCCC, 1990, mainly Article 3.1.
The BRICS on climate change global governance 4
Meridiano 47, 17: e17020, 2016 Rinaldi, Martuscelli  
Annex-I (most members of OECD at that time), carrying more responsibility and obligation on 
reducing GHG emission; and the ‘rest’ with no legal binding on that. Another central feature was the 
incorporation of resource and technology transfers to developing countries by the major powers9, 
in order to fight some negative effects of climate change and to adapt their economies to a more 
sustainable pattern (Barros-Platiau, 2010, 2011; Hurrel and Sengupta, 2012). 
In fact, authorities from the BRICS have emphasized that the key to succeed in climate negotiations 
lies in commitments’ taking by rich countries to reduce GHG emissions, while simultaneously boosting 
funding to developing countries in the form of aid and promotion of clean technology (Leal-Arcas, 
2013). Therefore, financial10 and technology transferred by the former is a good incentive to encourage 
these countries to commit to some climate regime (Omuko, 2014).
During the COPs’ third edition, 1997, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was negotiated. Broadly speaking, 
the Protocol established some goals and commitments that put forward differentiated reductions of 
GHG for each country. The Annex I group should reduce its emissions by 5% in comparison to 1990 
in a five-year period (between 2008-2012). On the other hand, for the Non-Annex I – precisely the 
developing countries – no binding commitment was determined11. As there was no consensus about 
a model to follow, in 2009 the KP was postponed to be discussed in a second term. 
During COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009), when some commitments were expected to happen, the 
post-Kyoto debates again did not flourish (Barros-Platiau, 2011). In addition, the BRICS countries 
had a great participation in that matter, because even without mandatory commitments, the group 
has taken up voluntary emission reduction targets under the Accord12.
The BRICS’ position
Starting from the point of view that it is no longer possible to solve transnational problems 
counting only with the major powers, climate change is another challenge that require global responses, 
even more if we consider that the success of the policies to relieve the negative effects depends on 
the involvement of emerging countries (Flemes, 2010; Alexandroff and Cooper, 2010). After all, they 
are, as it known, big GHG’s emitters13. 
Since the BRICS’ first summit in 2009, the climate issue was considered an important theme on 
their agenda. Related to energy efficiency, they declare prepared to promote conversations to deal 
with climate changes in bases of the CBDR principle, considering the need to combine measures to 
protect the environment with actions toward their goals of socioeconomic development (BRICS, 2009).
9 Especially the United States of America and European Union. 
10 Another source they could turn to comes from the recently launched BRICS Bank. Cf. http://ndbbrics.org. 
11 For that, the US withdraw its participation. 
12 One central feature of the Copenhagen Conference was the promise made by developed countries to finance projects related to 
sustainability and clean energy in an amount about US$ 100 billion per year by 2020, from many sources (e.g. Clean Developed Mechanism). 
13 Emissions in Annex I countries increased by 3.3% in 2010, whereas emissions in non-Annex I continued increasing at 5.6% (IEA, 2012). 
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In the same year, during COP 15, they announced some quantitative, mid-term targets that they 
would voluntarily (rather than mandatorily) implement within their own borders to cut down their 
respective emissions. In this sense, Brazil pledged to reduce its national emissions by 36-39% below 
‘business as usual’ levels by 2020 (Barros-Platiau, 2010). China announced that it would reduce its 
emissions, in relation to its GDP, to 40-45% (considered as baseline in the year of 2005) by 2020. 
Russia stated that it would reduce between 10-25% comparing to the 1990’s. Finally, India also pledged 
that it would reduce its emissions, in relation to its GDP, by 20-25% (same 2005 baseline) by 2020 
(Hurrel and Sengupta, 2012). In that Conference the BASIC group was started (including Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China), and since then their Ministers of Environment have met to coordinate their 
participation on climate negotiations (Hochtstetler, 2012; Maupin and Sidiropoulos, 2015).
The COP 17, in 2011, was the first one with South Africa integrating the BRICS’ group. There 
all countries reached a consensus stipulating the renewing of KP to a second term. Russia, however, 
declared no interest in participating, presenting, for that matter, arguments that the developing 
countries should also commit themselves with legal obligations of emission reduction (Viola and 
Basso, 2014, 2016).
At the third summit, held in 2013 in Durban, they declared commitment to work towards a 
comprehensive, balanced and binding outcome to strengthen the implementation of the UNFCCC and 
KP (BRICS, 2013). More recently, during the Paris Conference (2015), countries declared commitments 
that, if fully implemented, will limit average temperature increase around 2.7°C in the long-run 
(BRICS, 2015).
As we said in the Introduction section, our focus here is to explore and analyze some particular 
points in this general context, so we should now pay special attention to the importance of the proposal 
of ‘INDCs’ to the effectiveness of practices foreseeing to tackle the effects of climate problems. 
In that way, according to the countries’ proposals, their pledges can be perceived as conservative14 
(Viola et al. 2012; Viola and Basso, 2016). For instance, China is not part of the Annex I and is a 
grand promoter of G77+China coalition, which defends a radical reading of the CBDR principle and 
tries to push developed countries into reducing their emissions first15. In its INDC, China’s proposal 
was general: to reduce carbon intensity of its GDP by 60-65%; to increase the share of non-fossil 
fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%; and to increase the forest stock volume by 
around 4.5 billion cubic meters, all by 2030 having 2005 numbers as baseline (UN, 2015 apud Viola 
and Basso, 2016). Using the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), 2015,16 as a tool for ranking, the pledge 
was considered mild. More ambitious commitments would be required to really move further on a 
consistent mindset change, with effects on practical terms.
Russia, in turn, among the BRICS countries is the only one in the Annex I group. Some of its 
emissions decreased about 13% around the first years after the Soviet debacle and 2012, mostly due 
14 According to the authors (p. 13): ‘When a country is mostly in favor of measures which really push climate change mitigation, thus 
reforming the current regime, it will be classified as reformist; when it opposes such measures it will be classified as conservative’.
15 This can be described as “the race to be second”, as Benito Mueller put it, for climate talks (Barros-Platiau, 2010).
16 Cf. <http://climateactiontracker.org>. 
The BRICS on climate change global governance 6
Meridiano 47, 17: e17020, 2016 Rinaldi, Martuscelli  
to reduction of its economic activity, not for its efforts to mitigate the GHG’ effects. In its INDC, 
the Russians pledged to reduce their emissions around 25-30% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels 
(UN, 2015 apud Viola and Basso, 2016; UNFCCC, 2014). According to CAT (2015), that proposal 
was classified as inadequate, privileging ‘natural mechanisms’ (capability of their forests to absorb 
the gases) instead of real changes on its pattern of development and use of energy resources. 
India, which is one of the most active defenders of the CBDR, resists to assume commitments 
that may reflect negatively on its economic trajectory and affect the situation of internal population17. 
In its INDC, India pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33-35% by 2030 from 
2005 level and to achieve about 40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel 
based energy resources by 2030 (UN, 2015 apud Viola and Basso, 2015). The CAT (2015) classified 
it as mild. Following CAT’s criteria, we also consider it as unambitious.
Brazilian position in the climate regime pledged to reduce its emissions growth, compared to 
‘business as usual’ scenarios, by 36-39% until 2020, and to cut 80% of deforestation by 2020, taken 
as baseline the year of 2005. In its INDC, Brazil projected to reduce emissions by 37% until 2025 and 
43% until 2030, on the same baseline (UN, 2015 apud Viola and Basso, 2016). However, increasing 
the share of sustainable biofuels to approximately 18% by 2030 is not challenging when bioenergy 
already answered for 17.6% in the transport sector in 2014. Achieving 45% of renewable in the energy 
mix by 2030 is also not as challenging as their share average 43% between 2004 and 2014. Increasing 
renewable energy sources other than hydro in the total energy mix between 28-33% by 2030 when 
they already accounted for 27.9% in 2014 is equally conservative (Viola and Basso, 2016). Brazilian 
pledge was classified as mild: the country is very close to reaching the objective just by maintaining 
current policies. The Brazilian INDC is not ambitious.
Finally, South Africa has committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 
2025 under the ‘business as usual’ baseline (UNFCCC, 2010). 
For all that has been presented, it is important to discuss the implications of these positions for 
international politics issues, especially assessing the BRICS’ role on contributing to reach reasonable 
results, as they are a group seeking to enhance their own influence on global governance.
Firstly, it is clear that there is no common positon among them. Not only are the ambitions and 
proposal scopes different, but also the policies divert. For instance, while China and South Africa 
decided to define their goals acknowledging that there is going to be a peak in next decades, and 
then a very decline from 2030 on, the Indians opted to reduce their GHG emissions progressively. 
Brazil, in turn, chose to present an absolute contribution. Finally, the Russians opted for some kind 
of ‘natural mechanism’ to diminish their emissions (BPC, 2015). That illustrates the difficulty to 
identify convergent measures over climate issues. Although all of them recognize the necessity and 
importance of acting on the same ground, in order to amplify the impacts of their actions, there is 
no synchronized behavior.
17 As the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put it directly ‘climate change is a concern which needs to be tackled in a framework 
of cooperation, rather than coercion’ (Debidatta, 2015).
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Secondly, the Russians present a jarring positon among BRICS. In part, that is because they 
are ranked in Annex I group, so some commitments and obligations rest directly upon them in 
comparison with the others – which do not have any. For example, Russia is not a supporter of the 
CBDR principle. In addition, they do not reveal any great interest in modifying their development 
model based on carbon-intensive, or in altering their energetic matrix, once they have the biggest 
natural gas reserve and are one of the biggest oil exporters. Finally, continuing with the global 
warming, some new economic opportunities may open to their frozen lands. 
From the perspective of the global governance and multilateral process of negotiation, the climate 
regime – and its respective obligations and recommendations – shows the difficulties experienced 
for countries to formulate adequate answers and to assume proper commitments. One of the greatest 
challenges is that there is an acknowledgment that, in the future, the costs to fight the effects of 
climate change will be higher if strict measures aren’t taken now. Thus, the countries are presenting 
a short-medium view on foreign policy. Few of them (if any) are willing to sacrifice the economic 
growth in the name of promoting ‘global public good’. In the end, all want to ‘free ride’ and none 
wants to ‘pay the check’.
Climate change measures taken by BRICS, then, have one central characteristic: there is an 
overriding objective of economic growth (Omuko, 2014). Therefore, their emission reduction measures 
are conditioned to the main goal of development. They are taking up actions only in areas in which 
their economic trajectories would not be hampered. That explains, at least in part, the unambitious 
features of the pledges.
If we think that all issues involving climate change demand global responses, either the countries 
assume their unequivocal responsibilities – historical and present – and act in order to coordinate 
reasonable efforts to mitigate the problem, or another 15 to 30 years of conferences and annual 
meetings would be necessary. In fact, nature will not support the current model-pattern of development 
and the use of natural resources. In this last hypothesis, BRICS would miss a great opportunity to 
show themselves as global leaders, solution-promoters and rule-makers. To become a great power 
it is necessary to carry on through this path. However, it seems that they are missing the chance18. 
The BRICS countries showed themselves to be unequivocally divided over their own actions, 
especially on the matter of climate change. Without any agreement on that fundamental issue, the 
group seems unlikely to continue playing a central role in climate negotiations. 
An effective climate change regime, then, should bring on board and place responsibility on 
all major GHG emitters in an equitable manner without ignoring, at the same time, the historical 
responsibilities on the part of developed countries. Therefore, the objective of the UNFCCC to stabilize 
GHG concentration in the atmosphere would be impossible without any action from BRICS. They 
must, then, participate in fighting climate change (Leal-Arcas, 2013; Omuko, 2014).
18 The BRICS also suffer pressure from other developing/least-developed countries to assume more emphatic measures to combat 
their GHG’ emissions – it was very clear at Copenhagen (Hochtstetler, 2012). We may insist on that to illustrate the objections that 
have been putting over the group to assume the prominent role that is expected from them.  
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Despite they repeatedly declare having willingness to act more forcefully to fight the problem, 
BRICS are still opposed to taking up binding emission reduction commitments. They justify this stance 
with the same argument: historical responsibility and technical improvements – which grips upon the 
CBDR principle and the financial technological capability of developed countries. In addition, the 
fact that the developed countries have emitted large amounts of GHG previously does not necessarily 
mean that BRICS should now be allowed to emit as much as previously emitted by the developed 
countries. This would not be sustainable to protect the climate system for the present and future 
generations, mainly because concentration of GHG in the atmosphere is already high (Omuko, 2014).
Final remarks
This article emphasized the importance of BRICS’ participation on climate change regime and 
its implications for global governance. While they are in some way engaged with voluntary emission 
reduction measures and show themselves able to play a significant role on this issue, the difficulties 
imposed by the differences on national interests and disagreements about binding commitments are 
challenging them. 
All of them recognize that an action on global climate change cannot be successful without their 
involvement. The BRICS today are amongst the largest GHG polluters in the world, so without their 
efforts the mitigation will be very difficult. However, it seems that another central preoccupation 
rests in their mind: economic growth. They are not willing to make any sacrifices to tackle a problem 
that is considered to be caused (historically) mainly by developed countries. For us, that is a sign 
that they are thinking with short-term view on foreign policy, something that does not correspond 
to their international ambitions.
In the end, the global governance on climate change seems to have become ‘gridlocked’, especially 
by the positions taken by the developing countries. In part, that is true. However, if they want to 
enhance influence in international politics and seat at the table with the major powers, more has to 
be done. So far, at least on climate issues, we have not seen anything like that. 
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Nota Press Release
Climate change and emerging powers: the BRICS’ case
What are the relations between emerging powers and global governance on climate change?
In this paper, written by Augusto Rinaldi and Patrícia Nabuco Martuscelli, both Ph.D. students on 
Political Science at University of Sao Paulo (Brazil), it is highlighted this critical issue that is arousing 
great debate: the role played by emerging powers on climate change global governance, specifically by 
the group so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). These countries have been on 
focus for many reasons, but mostly due to its significant contribution in worsening the climate situation, 
as well as for the difficult to present a shared solution.
Analyzing the most recently regimes and agreements concerning this thematic – mainly the UNFCCC 
agreements and COPs meetings –, the authors argue that BRICS’ members faces a series of constraints 
that makes difficult for them to adopt a unique stance in this respect. 
In this context, an interesting issue that recently has gained scientific approach concerns to the 
problems related to environment. In special, climate change and its main causes and effects are receiving 
closely attention from international academic community, as well as from private and non-governmental 
organizations and observers preoccupied with the consequences of this phenomenon to the globe.
Finally, it is important noting that this research contributes to further comprehension about BRICS’ 
behavior – not only on climate change, but also on other issue-areas –, while simultaneously stimulating 
future investigations, as the theme is not circumscribed to a specific period or group of countries. In other 
words, the analysis of emerging powers’ role on climate change global governance is a topic that should 
be constantly reviewed, as the summits and conferences occurs almost yearly and unexpected events may 
happen related to global warming and earth’s change. Consult the article for a more complete discussion.
